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negligent, the defendant 80'/, negligent and the parent '>'/< negligent. 
Unfortunately for the defendant, the m atter of the parent’s negligence 
was not properly pleaded and the court had to deliver judgment for full 
damage against the defendant.
Sim ilarly in Oliver v. B irm ingham Om nibus (10' the de­
fendant was found guilty of negligcncc and the p la in tiff’s grandfather 
found guilty of contributory negligence. Again the m atter of the con­
tributory negligence was not properly pleaded and the plaintiff was 
awarded full damages against the defendant.
It is subm itted that these cases indicate that the question of the 
contributory ncgligence of a parent can be properly brought before the 
court and that such claims will in all probability be favourably received. 
In this modern age of haste and hurry, John Public should not have to 
be confronted with swarms of negligent and unattended infants darting 
hither and yon over highways and byways to the utter disregard of the 
rights of others. Especially is this so where the very media which carrics 
them to their destination is conveniently provided by the infants’ 
parents. Bearing in mind the comments of Aldcrson B. and M athers 
CJKB it would he well for parents to make stricter supervision over the 
actions of their children or stand the possibility of being held liable for 
injuries sustained by them.
E R IC  I,. TEED*
<10> Supra (6).
•B .Sc., B.C.L., (U.N.B.I o f TEED & TEED. Sa in t Joh n , N.B.
U.N.B. L A W  JOURNAL 17
BADDELEY v. INLAND REVEN U E C O M M ISSIO N E RS 
(1953) 1 A .E.R. 63.
T rust — Charity — M oral, Social and Physical T rain ing and Recreation — 
W hether For Relief of Poverty or Beneficial to the Com m unity — 
W hether Religious Nexus Between Individuals Constitutes Them  a 
Section of the Public.
This case raises several problems in the well-ploughed field of charit­
able trusts, including the question of trusts for the relief of poverty, 
for recreational facilities and a consideration of whether a class of 
people, determ ined by their affiliation with a particular religious group, 
is a part of the com m unity for the purpose of a trust beneficial to the 
com m unity.
Two conveyances, both dated the same day, transferred several 
pieces of land to trustees who were directed to allow the property in 
each case “ to be appropriated and used by the leaders for the tim e 
being of the Stratford Newton M ethodist M ission under the name of 
the ‘Newton T rust’ ” for certain purposes, inter alia , for the moral, 
social and physical training and recreation of persons resident in the 
county boroughs of W est Ham and Leyton in the county of Essex who 
were members of the M ethodist Church or were likelv to become 
members of that church and lacked the means otherwise to enjoy the
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advantages provided bv the trusts, and for the promotion and cncouragc- 
m cnt of all forms of such activities as were calculated to contribute to 
the health and well-being of such persons. It was contended by the 
trustees (taxpavcrs) that the conveyances were exempt from the doubled 
stamp duty imposed bv s. 52(1) of the Finance Act, 1947. since the 
trust was established for charitable purposes onlv and accordingly came 
under s. 54(1) of that Act.
In support of their claim  the trustees invoked two of the four 
classifications of charitable trusts delineated bv Lord M acnaghten in 
Income Tax Commissioners v. Penisel, (1) nam ely, trusts for the relief 
of poverty and trusts for other purposes bcncficial to the com m unity. 
M r. Justicc Harman, who heard the case, disposed shortly of the ground 
of relief of poverty:
“ R elief' seems to connote need o f some so il, e ith er need o f a hom e o r  
of the means to provide  fo r some necessity o r quasi-necessity anti not 
m ereh  fo r an am usem ent, how ever health ) it is."
Among the conceivable objects of the trusts in the present case were 
activities which well could be termed amusements. In passing, the 
learned judge points out that to have a trust for the relief of poverty 
which is also a charitable trust, the poverty does not have to be a 
state of “absolute want or grinding need.”
I he trustees’ view that the trusts were for the benefit of the 
com m unity also failed. On this ground, the learned judge followed 
the decision in Londonderry Presbyterian Church House Trustees 
v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (2), a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal of Northern Ireland, and held that the recreative provisions in 
the instant case did not constitute a charitablc trust.
M r. Justicc H arm an’s judgment contains an interesting dictum ; 
it conccrns the point whether a class of persons ascertained by reference 
to their connection w ith a particular religious denomination can be 
regarded as a section of the com m unity w ithin the fourth catcgorv of 
Pem sel’s case (supra). T he learned judge states that had lie held recrea­
tion to be appropriate subject-matter for a charitable trust, the question 
would still remain for determ ination whether the objcct was a public 
one; that is, one that would benefit the com m unity or a class of the 
com m unity. T he individuals which the trust in this case had in view 
had to be inhabitants of two boroughs in the country of Essex, persons 
of insufficient means, and cither M ethodists or likely to become 
M ethodists. In the learned judge’s opinion, these individuals would 
form a section of the com m unity, so that had he held recreation to be 
a charitablc objcct, he would have held the purpose here to be a public 
recreation. This was the view expressed by two of the three members 
of the Court of Appeal in the Londonderry ease (supra).
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T he conclusions on this m atter, however, are not all one wav.
In Re Hobouni Aero Components L td .’s Air Raid Distress Fund (3), 
the Court of Appeal held that although the fund in that particular 
case was for the relief of air-raid distress, its purposes were of a personal, 
and not of a public character, because it was mcrclv for the benefit of 
the employees of a particular company who were themselves, for the 
main part, the subscribers to the fund, and, moreover, the benefits 
were confined to such of the employees as had subscribed to the 
fund. In Opponheim v. Tobacco Securities T rust Co., L td . (4), bv 
a settlem ent trustees were directed to apply certain income “ in pro­
viding for . . .  the education of children of employees or former 
em ployees” of a British lim ited company or any of its subsidiary or 
allied companies. T he employees so indicated numbered over 110,000. 
The House of Lords held, Lord M acD crm ott dissenting, that the com­
mon em ploym ent of the beneficiaries would not be a quality  which 
constituted them a section of the com m unity so as to afford to the trust 
the necessary public character to render it charitable, so the gift was 
void for perpetuity. T he Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Cox (5), 
considered tnc following gifts: “To pav the incomc thereof in per­
petu ity for charitable purposes only; the persons to benefit directly in 
pursuance of such charitable purposes arc to be only such as shall be 
or shall have been employees of T he Canada Life Assurance Com pany 
and/or the dependents of such employees . . . ” It was held that the 
gift was not a valid charitable gift for it was not for the benefit of the 
public or an appreciably important section of the public.
A lthough the designated groups in these last three cases were 
not religious denom inations, the decisions illustrate that the problem 
whether ccrtain individuals form a class of the com m unity is one 
shared by all the tvpcs of purportedly charitable trusts( w ith the pos­
sible exception of the anomalous “)X>or relations” cases). To determ ine 
the public character of the gift, the test is not the nature of the gift; 
that is, whether it be for the relief of poverty, or for the advancement 
of education, or for the advancement of religion; it is, rather, the des­
cription of the beneficiaries. T he words of Lord Greene, M .R . in 
Re Compton (6) appear in point:
“No d efin itio n  o f w hat is m eant by a section o f the pu blic  has, so fa r  
as I am aw are, been laid  dow n, and I certa in ly  do not propose to be the  
first to m ake the attem p t to define it .”
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